necessary for the characterization of forward induction to use incomplete preferences that cannot be represented by subjective probabilities, while Asheim [3] points to the possibility of characterizing backward induction without the use of subjective probabilities since one can convincingly argue that subjective probabilities play no role in the backward induction argument.
When deriving belief operators from preferences, it is essential that the preferences determine 'subjective possibility' (so that it can be determined whether an event is subjectively impossible) as well as 'epistemic priority' (so that one allows for nontrivial belief revision). As we shall see, preferences need not satisfy completeness to determine 'subjective possibility' and 'epistemic priority'. We intend to show how belief operators corresponding to those used in the literature can be derived from preferences that need not be complete. 1
After presenting the decision-theoretic framework in Sect. 2, we show in Sect. 3 how a binary accessibility relation of epistemic priority Q can be derived from preferences that satisfy conditions that are weaker than those usually applied in the Anscombe-Aumann [2] framework. The properties of this priority relation are similar to but more general than those found, e.g., in Lamarre & Shoham [19] and Stalnaker [24, 25] in that reflexivity is not required. Furthermore, we show how preferences give rise to a vector of nested binary accessibility relations (R1,..., RL), where, for each k, Rk fulfills the usual properties of Kripke representations of beliefs; i.e., they are serial, transitive and euclidean. Finally, we establish that the two kinds of accessibility relations yield two equivalent representations of 'subjective possibility' and 'epistemic priority'.
In Sect. 4 we use Q to define the following belief operators:
• Certain belief corresponds to what Morris [20] calls 'Savage-belief' and means that the complement of the event is subjectively impossible.
• Conditional belief is a generalization of 'conditional belief with probability 1'.
• Full belief corresponds to what Stalnaker [25] calls 'absolutely robust belief'.
l'Epistemic priority' will here be used to refer to what elsewhere is sometimes referred to as 'plausibility' or 'prejudice'; see, e.g., Friedman & Halpern [15] and Lamerre & Shoham [19] . This is similar to 'preference' among states (or worlds) in nonmonotonic logic (cf. Shoham [23] and Kraus et al. [18] ), leading agents towards some states and away from others. In contrast, we use 'preferences' in the decision-theoretic sense of a binary relation on the set of functions ('acts') from states to outcomes; see Sect. 2.
We then in Sect. 5 show how these operators can be characterized by means of (R1,... ,RL), while we in Sect. 6 show that the full belief operator (while poorly behaved) is bounded by certain and conditional belief, which are KD45 operators.
In Sect. 7 we interpret our one-agent decision-theoretic framework in terms of the n-agent decision-theoretic framework encountered in games, and note how the characterization of full belief corresponds to the primitive definition of this operator in Asheim & Dufwenberg [4] as well as Brandenburger & Keisler's [13] concept of 'assumption'. In Sect. 8 we amend the decision-theoretic framework to be able to handle systems of conditional preferences used in analyses of extensive form games and show how Battigalli & Siniscalchi's [6] concept of 'strong belief' is related to full belief. We thereby reconcile and compare these non-standard notions of belief which have recently been used in epistemic analyses of games. We conclude in Sect. 9.
Throughout we assume that the subjective belief operators are derived from the initial (ex-ante) preferences of the decision maker. As this differs from Feinberg's [14] framework for subjective reasoning in dynamic games --where beliefs are not constrained to be evolving or revised, but are represented whenever there is a decision to be made --a closer comparison of our approach to his will be left for future world.
Decision-theoretic Framework
Consider a decision maker under uncertainty. Let W be a finite set of states (or possible worlds), where the decision maker is uncertain about what the true state is. Let Z be a finite set of outcomes. In the tradition of Anscombe & Aumann [2] , the decision maker has preferences over the set of functions that assign an objective randomization over outcomes to any state. Any such function x : W ~ A(Z) is called an act on W. If the true state is a, then the preferences of the decision maker is a binary relation ~a on the set of acts, with ~a and ,~a denoting the asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively. For any a E W, L -a is assumed to be reflexive and transitive, but not necessarily complete, and to satisfy nontriviality and objective independence (where these terms are defined in [8, p. 64] 
From Preferences to Accessibility Relations
We derive two kinds of accessibility relation from preferences. The one kind is based on the infinitely-more-likely relation, while the other kind is based on admissibility on subsets.
Definition 2 aQb ("a does not have higher epistemic priority than b') if
b is not Savage-null at a, and (3) a is not deemed infinitely more likely than b at a.
Proposition 2 The relation Q is serial, 2 transitive, and satisfies forward linearity 3 and quasi-backward linearity. 4
Consider the collection of all sets A satisfying that ~a is admissible on A. Since ~a is admissible on ~a, it follows that the collection is non-empty as it is contains ~a. Furthermore, since any b E A is not Savage-null at a if ~ is admissible on A, it follows that any set in this collection is a subset of ~. 
Defining Belief Operators
We show how belief operators can be defined using the accessibility relation of epistemic priority, Q, having the properties of Prop. 2. 6 The set of states that are deemed subjectively possible at a is given by h a = {b e ~'al3c such that cQb} = {b E TalbQb}, where a~ ¢ O since Q is serial, and where the last equality follows since bQb if cQb. 'Conditional belief' is defined conditionally on sets that are subjectively possible at any state; i.e., sets in the following collection:
Sin the full version of this paper we show how equivalence classes can be derived from Q with the properties of Prop. 2, implying that Q with such properties suffices for defining the belief operators.
In particular, W E • and, V¢ E ¢, 0 ¢ ¢ a_ W.
Since every ¢ E • is subjectively possible at any state, it follows that, V¢ E ~, ~a(¢) :_~_ {b E T a n¢lVc E n ¢, cQb} # ~. Hence, at a an event A is believed conditional on ¢ if A contains any state in 'raN¢ with at least as high epistemic priority as any other state in T a n ¢. This way of defining conditional belief is in the tradition of, e.g., Grove [16] , Katsuno & Mendelzon [17] , Boutilier [9] , and Lamerre & Shoham [19] .
Let ~A be the collection of subjectively possible events ¢ having the property that A is subjectively possible conditional on ¢ whenever A is subjectively possible:
~A := {¢E 2w\{o}lVa E W, ~a N ¢ ¢ ~, a n d A n~a n ¢ ¢ O i f A n a a~O } .
Note that ~A is a subset of ~ that satisfies W E ,I~A; hence, 0 ¢ ~A C O. and 'strong belief', introduced by Brandenburger & Keisler [13] and Battigalli & Siniscalchi [6] respectively, will be discussed in Sects. 7 and 8.
Characterizing Belief Operators
We now show how the certain, conditional, and full belief operators can be characterized by means the vector of nested accessibility relations (R1,..., RL) having the properties of Prop. 3 and being related to Q as in Prop. 4. 7
P r o p o s i t i o n 5 KA --{a E Wip ~ c A}.
Tin the full version of this paper we first derive (R1,... ,RL) from Q and then show how (R1 . . . . . RL) characterizes the belief operators. In combination with Prop. 4(ii) Prop. 7 means that A is fully believed iff any subjectively possible state in A has higher epistemic priority than any state in the same equivalence class outside A.
Proposition 6 V¢ E ¢, B(¢)A = {a E

ProperlLies of Belief Operators
In the full version of this paper we show that certain belief and conditional belief are KD45 operators, and that conditional belief satisfies the usual properties for belief revision as given by Stalnaker [25] (see also AlchourrSn et al. [1] ). The full belief operator is, however, not as well behaved. 
Proposition 8 KA C BOA C B(W)A.
Proposition 9 The following properties hold: (i) BOA n BOA ' c B°(A n A'), (ii)
BOA
Epistemic analysis of strategic form games
Let Si denote player i's finite set of pure strategies, and let z : S --~ Z map strategy vectors into outcomes, where S = S1 x $2 is the set of strategy vectors and Z is the finite set of outcomes. Then (S1, $2, z) is a finite strategic two-person game form.
For each player i, any of i's strategies is an act from strategy choices of his opponent j to outcomes. The uncertainty faced by a player i in a strategic game form concerns j's strategy choice, j's preferences over acts from i's strategy choices to outcomes, and so on (see Tan & Werlang [26] ). A type of a player i corresponds to preferences over acts from j's strategy choices, preferences over acts from j's preferences over acts from i's strategy choices, and so on.
By adding subscript i to the framework introduced in Sect. 2, the finite set of states (or possible worlds) for player i, Wi, can be interpreted as Asheim & Dufwenberg [4] employ an interactive preference structure like the one described in Def. 7. They say that an event A is fully believed at a if the preferences at a are admissible on the set of states in A that are deemed subjective possible at a. It follows from Prop. 7 that this corresponds to full belief as defined in Def. 6.
Refer again to the decision maker without subscript i. Brandenburger & Keisler [13] consider an interactive preference structure where, for any a 6 W, _h a is assumed to satisfy completeness as well as partitional continuity (in the sense of [8, Axiom
4"]). Then Blume et al. [8, Thin. 5.3] implies that _h a is represented by u a and a lexicographic conditional probability system (LCPS) --i.e., a hierarchy of subjective probability distributions with non-overlapping supports where the support of the klevel probability distribution pak equals rk~, and where {~r~,... ,71.Laa } is a partition of aa (cf. Refer again to a decision maker without the subscript i. As before, for any a E A, let ~.a denote the equivalence class to which a belongs, let h a denote the set of subjectively possible states at a, and let • denote the collection of sets that are subjectively possible at any state. For each a E W, consider a system off conditional preferences, {~ I¢ E ¢}, in the following sense: For any ¢ E ¢, the preferences of the decision maker conditional on ¢ is a binary relation ~ on the set of acts on ¢;
i.e., on the set of functions x¢ : ¢ ~ A(Z).
When one considers the above setting, Battigalli & Siniscalchi [6] and Ben-Porath Battigalli & Siniscalchi [6] and Ben-Porath [7] employ a CPS to define the system of conditional preferences.
Battigalli & Siniscalchi [6] and Ben-Porath [7] define conditional belief with probability 1: At a the decision maker believes A conditional on ¢ if suppp~ c_ A. In the full version, we show that this conditional belief operator coincides with the B(¢)
operator of the present paper. Therefore, we can define Battigalli & Siniscalchi's [6] 'strong belief' operator as follows, where ~H N ~A is the collection of subgames ¢ having the property that A is subjectively possible conditional on ¢ whenever A is subjectively possible.
Definition 9 (Battigalli & Siniscalchi [6] ) At a the decision maker strongly be-
Hence, at a an event A is strongly believed if A is robustly believed in the following sense: A is belie, ved conditional on any subgame ¢ that does not make A subjectively impossible. Since cA D cH fq ~A _~ {W}, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 11 If a E B°(A), then A is strongly believed at a. If A is strongly believed at a, then a E B(W)A.
The 'strong belief' operator shares the properties of full belief: It satisfies the properties of Prop. 9, but is not monotonic.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a model with (i) a serial, transitive, forwardly linear and quasibackwardly linear epistemic priority relation Q, and, equivalently, (ii) a vector of nested, serial, transitive and euclidean accessibility relations (R1,.
• •, RL). These give two equivalent representations of the notions of 'subjective possibility' and 'epistemic priority', on which the concepts of certain, conditional, and full belief are based. Both Q and (R1,..., RL) Can be derived from preferences that need not be complete and thus representable by subjective probabilities.
This model does not require that the epistemic priority relation is reflexive. The decision maker may be subjectively unable to distinguish between two objectively possible states, while deeming (at the lowest epistemic level) that one is subjectively possible and the other not. Because Q lacks reflexivity, not even the certain belief operator obeys the truth axiom; thus, we allow that the decision maker holds the true state as subjectively impossible (even at the lowest epistemic level).
The distinction between subjectively possible and subjectively impossible events can be illustrated within an interactive preference structure for the strategic game form of a multi-stage game (cf. Def. 7 and Sect. 8). If each player considers any opponent strategy to be subjectively possible, then any ¢ E (I)H (the collection of subsets of states that correspond to subgames) will be subjectively possible, as well as potentially observable (cf. Brandenburger [11] ). The player can still deem it subjectively impossible that the opponent holds particular preferences, as the preferences' of the opponent are not directly observable. Brandenburger & Keisler [12] show that there need not exist a preference-complete interactive preference structure when preferences are not representable by subjective probabilities. This result makes models that do not require a decision maker to hold all objectively possible opponent preferences as subjectively possible particularly relevant in game-theoretic applications.
